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CORI'ORATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION. By George T. Washington. New
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1942. Pp. xii, 519. $7.00.
TnE subject matter of Professor Washington's book is a good deal broader
than one might infer from the title. The problems of executive compensation
as he conceives them are not limited to such questions as the extent to which
compensation provisions are likely to be disapproved by the courts either
because the remuneration is deemed excessive or because the methods by
which compensation has been voted are considered improper. They include
also problems of drafting the compensation contract, problems of taxability
both of the remunerated executive and of the corporation which is seeking
to deduct the amount of the remuneration from its taxable income, problems
of officers' and directors' rights to indemnity against expenses incurred in
defending themselves against charges of misconduct, and problems relating
to the validity, construction, and draftsmanship of indemnity agreements.
These indemnity problems are considered with special reference to the pro-
visions of the Federal Securities Act and of Sections 27a and 61a of the
General Corporation Law of New York.
In his introductory chapter, the author describes his objective in the fol-
lowing language:
"The purpose of this book is to study, against the background of our law of
corporations, with its emphasis on traditional economic patterns, the system of
managerial rewards that has grown up in this country during the last three or
four decades. We will also study the impact of the regulatory and tax policies
of the federal government. There will be no attempt to suggest ready-made plans
of compensation: the needs of individual enterprises are too various. The dis-
cussion which follows is intended to give, in as simple and direct a fashion as
the subject matter permits, a short treatment of the chief legal and practical
problems encountered in the drafting and adoption of plans for managerial
compensation. This may serve as a starting point for corporate managers and
their advisers in considering the needs of a particular company. It may also
prove useful to investors, government officials, and others interested in modern
business."
As one reads on, it becomes apparent that the book is addressed primarily
to corporate managers and their legal advisers. It is not that Professor Wash-
ington is unsympathetic with demands that the law of managerial compensa-
tion be developed in ways which will encourage adherence to strict Stan-
dards of fiduciary obligation. For example, he expresses complete agreement
with Mr. Justice Stone's castigation of the conduct of the officer-directors of
the American Tobacco Company with respect to the stock bonus which was
under attack in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Company.' In his chapters on
indemnity agreements he questions the propriety as well as the legality of
1. 288 U. S. 123 (1933).
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the blanket-type indenmity agreements which have been adopted by many
corporations in recent years.
Nevertheless, such discussions as the book contains about legal, social and
economic policy and the need for protecting shareholders and others against
managerial self-interest are carried on in a minor key. Professor Washing-
ton is chiefly concerned with giving advice to corporation lawyers as to how
to give legally sound advice to corporate executives. To say this is not to
criticize his book adversely. The principal demand for a book dealing with
the legal aspects of corporate executives' compensation comes from execu-
tives and their attorneys, and this book, like most law books, is written to
sell and not simply as a piece of academic research. Moreover, the author's
advice is excellent. The unwise extremes to which some lawyers have en-
couraged their clients to go in devising unfair compensation plans and in-
demnity agreements, in permitting interested directors to determine their own
compensation and in concealing the results from shareholders, indicate that
many corporation lawyers are in need of the author's counsel of moderation
as well as of his thorough grasp of the more technical aspects of the subject.
On the other hand, those of us who are interested in the subject from the
point of view of public rather than private interest would have welcomed a
fuller consideration of certain aspects of the problem. For example, Profes-
sor Washington expresses the view that the cases are comparatively few in
which management has made use of special rewards other than fixed salaries
"in order to obtain rewards of a nature and extent not readily understood by
the shareholders or by the public." How can he know? There may be few
litigated cases in which the existence of such a motive is apparent .n the
face of the record. But what of the unlitigated cases? A management which
is trying "to obtain rewards of an extent not readily understood" will be
likely to do everything possible to cover its tracks so effectively as to make
discovery and legal attack by litigious shareholders extremely difficult. Pau-
city of litigated cases is therefore an unreliable index of what has been
going on. To anyone who is concerned about the adequacy of our present
judicial and statutory controls over salaries and bonuses, the question whether
the type of behavior to which the author refers has been rare or fairly com-
mon is important enough to deserve fuller treatment, even though it may be
impossible to answer the question categorically.
Again, what of the point made by Berle and Means that "the traditional
logic of profits"-as distinct from the traditional logic of property---"would
indicate that if profits must be distributed eithcr to the owners or to the con-
trol only a fair return to capital should be distributed to the 'owners' while
the remainder should go to the control as an inducement to the most efficient
ultimate management." 2 How far is this theory, or an inarticulate groping
after this theory, a motivating factor in inducing management to seek a large
slice of profits even where the profits are largely monopoly or windfall profits
rather than profits due to efficiency? Are we dealing in these compensation
cases merely with disputes as to what managers are worth to their corpora-
tions, complicated by the fact that in many cases the managers are in effect
judges in their own causes, or are we dealing with something more funda-
2. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PaorrY (1932) 344.
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mental-a belief, or at least a vague feeling on the part of management, that
it is hiring capital rather than that absentee capitalists are hiring it?
On the other hand, is there not substantial evidence of a growing popular
feeling that million-dollar bonuses are wrong, not so much because the money
ought to go to the shareholders as because it is felt to be indecent to charge
so much for managing an enterprise which is in essence, if not in literal legal
theory, engaged in performing a public service? Do legal rules which permit
the payment of such bonuses and then subject the recipient of them to drastic
taxation adequately satisfy this popular feeling-particularly in time of war?
If additional controls are needed, should not the objective be to prevent pay-
ment of excessive compensation rather than to encourage litigation to
compel restitution? Are not these and other like questions apt to be in the
background, if not in the foreground, of the minds of those judges who are
sensitive to the intellectual and emotional climate of our era? A line here
and there in Professor Washington's book indicates that he is not unaware
of these problems; but for him, as for a lawyer who is engaged in advising
a client rather than in philosophizing, they are on the fringes of his subject
rather than at or near its core.
The most valuable part of the book, for practitioner and academic student
alike, is that relating to indemnity and indemnity agreements. Here Pro-
fessor Washington is examining a process of rule-making, legislative, judi-
cial, and contractual, which is just beginning to emerge from the embryonic
stage. It is on the subject of indemnity agreements especially that his coun-
sels to corporation lawyers are counsels of caution. He is, to be sure, justi-
fiably critical of judicial decisions which deny the existence of any corporate
power to indemnify or reimburse directors for the expenses of defending
themselves against charges of official misconduct even where the directors
have been completely exonerated by a judicial decision in their favor on the
merits. On the other hand, he insists that, generally speaking, claims for
indemnity should be made in the court in which the suit against the directors
has been tried, and if not made there, when there was an opportunity, should
be treated as 'having been abandoned.
If all trial courts were ready to exercise the powers which the author, like
the reviewer, believes they should 'exercise, there would be little need for
permitting the corporation itself to determine the question of reimbursement
or for permitting the question to be litigated in a separate action. Most suits
against directors are shareholders' suits, with the corporation present in court
as a party. To compel the corporate principal to reimburse the directors in
such a case, where they have established their innocence, should be within
the powers of a court of equity. Nevertheless, as Professor Washington
points out, there are suits to which the corporation is not necessarily a party
-suits arising under Section 11 of the Securities Act, for example-in which
the directors' successful defense may reasonably be deemed to entitle them
to reimbursement. The trial court would be helpless in such a situation,
In view of this fact and of the doubt whether all trial courts in which di-
rectors might be sued are now prepared to decree reimbursement in all appro-
priate cases, even where the corporation is in court, one can hardly deny
that the present movement for inserting reimbursement or indemnity provi-
sions in corporate bylaws has considerable justification. Nevertheless, as
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Professor Washington abundantly demonstrates, it is difficult to draft by-
laws on the subject which are neither undesirably narrow, undesirably broad.
nor undesirably vague. Perhaps, as the author suggests at the end of hi;
chapter on the New York indemnity statutes, it might be desirable to enact
a statute "in which the principles of adequate bargaining"--ns iw dealt with
rather ineptly in Section 27a of the New York Act--'and judicial supervi-
sion"--now dealt with in Section 61a of the New York .\ct---"will buth he
utilized." This implies that he would, if he were a legislator, be inclined to
explore the practicability of legislation which would subject either indemnity
agreements or action taken pursuant to such agreements, or both, to judicial
scrutiny. The reviewer wishes that he had made some preliminary surveys
on the subject in this book. But it would be unreasonable to quarrel with
him for concerning himself with the law as it is rather than with the law
as it might be.
H. NERRICm DODD "
MILITARY LAW AND DEFENSE LEGISLATION. By A. Arthur Schiller. St. Paul:
West Publishing Co., 1941. Pp. x-iv, 647. $5.00.
THis is the first attempt at a casebook on military law since Dean (then
Colonel) WVignore's compilation was published shortly after the close of
World War V.1 Both volumes pose at the outset the question of the proper
scope of a wartime course on the subject. Is the instruction in military la,.
to be basically a fad for the law professors, on a par with the conditioning
of kiddies in the name of civilian defense and the wearing of attractive
uniforms by even more attractive female war workers? Is the purpose of
the course the education of the civilian lawyer who by reason of overage,
dependency, or disability will remain in mufti for the duration? Or is the
course designed to impart to the law students about to be called for service
a working knowledge of the problems they will have to face once they are
on active duty?
I suppose that the proper objective is not over one-third of the second,
and not less than two-thirds of the last - in short, essentially utilitarian.
judged by that standard, the compiler's selection of materials is open to
very serious question. There is precious little if any utility to the long list
of cases tracing the development of the law on the minor's contract of
enlistment; only the legal antiquarian has any need to go behind In re
Grimley.2 Nor does the emphasis on the cases defining the scope of the
local draft boards' powers seem justified. Apart from the fact that the point
will concern only few military persons (other than those who Want out
1'Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. A SOURCE-Boor OF ,firr.," LAw and W.mt TixuE LErsLAT1UN; (1919).
2. 137 U. S. 147 (1890). Cases like Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 3
(1814), ScHir.a 110, are simply historical curiosities on several counts.
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from the Army), the basic principles are simple enough to be covered in
not over six cases. The space thus saved could profitably have been devoted
to martial law, which concerns soldiers and civilians alike, and which is
bound to affect a great deal of domestic territory before the bugles sound
demobilization in this particular war. (I agree that military government
is adequately covered by text materials).3
Moreover, it is very doubtful whether the law and practice of courts-
martial can be usefully taught by extracting paragraphs from the self-con-
tained Manual for Courts-Martial and reprinting them in a casebook (or,
if one prefers, a source-book). Apart from the circumstance that the present
compilation entirely and inexplicably ignores the Navy's court-martial sys-
tem, and does not even reprint the Articles for the Government of the Navy
in an appendix, it seems to me that the obvious solution is to teach court-
martial procedure direct from the applicable Manual (which is easily ob-
tainable from the Government Printing Office), resorting to the casebook
source-book simply for the text of apposite opinions on the scope of review,
or rulings of The Judge Advocate General on significant points -on which
the Manuals are silent. That was Wigmore's notion in 1918-19,4 and I
do not think that he was wrong.
The present compiler admits in his preface,5 what indeed is reflected by
his compilation, that the work was hastily prepared. It exhibits a definite
lack of familiarity with the material, particularly in the citation of presently
inapplicable decisions,' and the quotation of matter that had been amended
long before the present work went to press.7 Similarly, the citation of Army
Regulations without AR references detracts from the utility of the collec-
tion;8 no doubt law students have access to the CFR and the Federal
Register, but headquarters in the field, where military law is actually ad-
ministered, do not.9
This same unfamiliarity with military law in action has, it seems to me,
led the compiler to include some cases of extremely doubtful authority with-
out adequately flagging their dangers in footnotes. Thus, Ex parle Weitzi(
3. Notably FM 27-5, MILITARY GOVERNMENT (War Dep't, 1940), and c. 10, FM
27-10, Rui.Ls OF LAND WARFARE (War Dep't, 1940).
4. Wi MORE, op. cit. supra, note 1, at iii.
5. SCHILLER, V.
6. At SCHILLER 461, n. 59, there is a reference to a JAG opinion treating of the
period during which a soldier awaiting trial may be held in arrest - without mentioning
that AW 70 as amended in 1920 renders the opinion inapplicable.
7. MCM, par. 35a, as quoted in ScHILLEa 469 does not include the 1938 amend-
ment to the Manual which was made to conform the text to the 1937 change in
AW 70.
8. See, for example, pp. 122, 240, 244, 563.
9. The following inaccuracies are also to be noted: The statement of Ex parie
Dostal, 243 Fed. 664 (N. D. Ohio 1917), SCHILLER 118-19, confuses calling the National
Guard into federal service with drafting its members into federal service, and thus
ignores over a century's development of the militia. Similarly, ScHILLR 227, n. 80,
confuses National Guard, National Guard of the United States, and wartime State
Guards.
10. 256 Fed. 58 (D. Mass. 1919), SCHILLER 441.
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is cited as though it were still law; actually, it was based upon a decision
that was subsequently reversed, and it is now extremely doubtful on its
facts.11 The present limits of the jurisdiction over spies are left to depend
on the Waherski-' and Vessels 1 3 cases, without any indication that Attorney
General Gregory's opinion in the first case was in effect overruled by his
successor, and that the appeal in the second was dismissed ly stipulation
because the court-martial proceedings had been discontinued at the instance
of thc Department of Justice, representing the appellee! These matters had
been disclosed in print before the present volume went to press.'4  And
once more proceeding on the premise that the utilitarian approach is desired,
it seems distinctly unfortunate to set out Fix parte McKiltirich v. Brown'5
without mentioning that the case for the civil authorities went virtually
unargued, with the consequence that the court was unaware of, and hence
did not discuss, the controlling provisions of the National Defense Act.1'
Professor Schiller has prepared a useful collection of cases, one that will
be a valuable addition to any library of military law. It is distinctly not
a bad book. But a little more study, a little more soaking in the sources,
would have made it a very much better book, and a more useful and reliable
guide for the novice.
FREDERICK BERNAYS AVIENERt
Tu.E SOCIOLOGY OF LA\. By Georges Gurvitch. New York: Phil#'suphical
Library, 1942. Pp. xx, 309. $3.75.
T is is a brilliant book, in which nearly all the significant theories corre-
lating law and fundamental social phenomena are discussed, and in v hich
a comprehensive and original sociological theory of law is developed. Dif-
ferent kinds of law are correlated with the various types of social relations.
Such "frameworks of law" as trade-union law or family law are correlated
11. The decision was based on E.r parte .ihel. 253 Fed. 817 (D.S.C. 1918),
which was reversed. Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919), ceri. denied,
250 U. S. 645 (1919). Moreover, the 11citz case involved the interpretatin of "in
the field" in AW 2(d). It thus has no application outside the United Stateg; c.,m-
pare the first clause of AW 2(d). And while Massachusetts may not have hcen "in
the field" in 1918, who will venture to suggest that it will not be "in the field" in
1942 et seq.?
12. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 356 (1918), ScnazER 508.
13. United States cx rel. Vessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (E. D. N. Y. 1920),
ScHrIR.a 511.
14. ,ViENER, A PRAcrAcCAL MANUAL OF MARTrIAL LAw (1940) 111132, 133.
15. 337 'Mo. 281, 85 S. NV. (2d) 385 (1935), SCHITR 418, 514.
16. XNiENER, op. cit. supra note 14, 11141; Wiener, The Militia Clause of t:e
Constitution (1940) 54 HiARv. L. REV. 181, 213-15. The article last referred to (which
cites the preceding reference) is several times noted in the present volume. Scmixim
25 n. 7, 232 n. 82, 239 n. 86.
iLieutenant-Colonel, J.A.G.D.; judge Advocate, Trinidad Base Command, United
States Army.
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with the various types of social groups, and such "systems of law" as feudal
law or bourgeois law, with the various types of "all-inclusive societies."
These fundamental problems are examined from a unifying point of view,
since the author affirms that all-inclusive societies must be understood as
"syntheses and equilibria" of real groups, and these groups as "syntheses and
equilibria" of social relations, and that a corresponding relationship exists
between the different levels of legal phenomena. A very promising "frame of
reference" is thus created.
However, the findings are vitiated by the very unfortunate conception of
law which underlies the work -a conception of philosophical, or more
prec?.bly, phenomenological origin. Three criteria of law may be dis-
tinguished in Gurvitch's somewhat cumbersome definition (p. 59). First,
law is a realization of justice. The origins of this fundamental concept
may be traced to Aristotle, but few sociologists have thought in these
terms. Thus Sumner, when deploring the fact that modern nations had
forgotten the ancient concept of ethos, or of the standards of right, did
not mention law among them. Secondly, law is distinguished from other
standards of right by the existence of a "social guarantee" based on "col-
lective recognition of social facts which realize values" (p. 51). Law is
thus quite correctly classified as a species of the genus "social regulation."
This social guarantee is manifested in sanctions, i.e., in "different sorts of
reactions of disapprobation." Gurvitch explicitly states that "constraint," in
the sense of "precise measures determined in advance and taken against tie
delinquent" (pp. 58-59), does not belong among the criteria of law. Thirdly,
law is distinguished from other forms of social regulation by its bilateral or
even multilateral character, making it "imperative-attributive," i.e., consist-
ing of correlative claims and duties. This is an idea taken from the great
Russian-Polish jurist Petrazhitsky.
It is obvious that Gurvitch's departure from the communis opinio is
contained in the third point. For while the communis opinio, which exists
despite all variations in wording, quite logically tries to find the specific
criterion of law by analyzing the different forms of social guarantee,
Gurvitch's approach is rather more heterogeneous. A definition that is logi-
cally consistent cannot be "refuted". But it is permissible to discuss how
it works. A section in Chapter II, dealing with the "depth-levels" of law,
lends itself especially to such treatment. Gurvitch asserts that law is en-
gendered both by "organized and unorganized sociality." This statement
becomes somewhat clearer when it is noted that, in Gurvitch's opinion, the
State is the organization of the unorganized nation. Furthermore, in his
opinion, there are three levels of law depending on the forms of its
"acknowledgment": law fixed in advance, flexible law formulated ad hoc,
and intuitive law (i.e., when the normative fact is directly acknowledged with-
out benefit of any formal procedure, p. 227). Combining the two classifica-
tions above, Gurvitch finds six "depth-levels" of law and gives a cursory
review of the phenomena which he considers to be jural. In the opinion of
the reviewer, three classes of phenomena which are of highly different social
significance are here thrown together: phenomena termed law by common
opinion (statutes, the practice of courts, customary law, etc.), mores, and
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states of public opinion orientated towards law. The second and third point,
need some elaboration.
In regard to Negroes in the Southern states there is a conflict be-
tween constitutional law, based on the principle of the equality of men, and
mores, which call for different treatment of men depending on the color of
their skin. The Supreme Court's order that the Rock Island Railway Com-
pany desist from the practice of providing Negroes holding first class tickets
with accommodations which were inferior to thoe provided for white pas-
sengers,' could be interpreted as a partial victory of law over mores. But
Gurvitch's doctrine leads to a different interpretation. The discrimination
against Negroes is a manifestation of the unorganized intuitive law F the
white population of the United States (p. 229). Consequently, the decision
of the court would mean a victory of "fixed organized law" over "unorgan-
ized intuitive law." As he does not maintain that there is a hierarclhy of the
six "depth-levels" of law, the victory in his ductrine is as unpredictable as in
the doctrine of the communis opinio, which recognizes that, in conflicts he-
tween law and mores, victory is a question of fact.
Gurvitch rejects very positively the conceptual scheme of the conunis
opinjo. The concepts of custom and mores, he says, are based on confusion,
since they are merely "particular methods of acknowledgment of the differ-
ent types of social regulation" (jural, moral, religious, aesthetic, and educa-
tional, p. 60). Actually, there seems to be a confusion in Gurvitch's ideas.
Custom and mores are specific types of "standardized collective behavior,"
distinguished from technical and purely conventional standards, by their
being simultaneously "standards of right," at least in the opinion of those who
follow them or try to enforce them. The point is that the existence of a
practice does not of itself allow us to "acknowledge" the existence of a stan-
dard of right. The process is much more complicated than that asstuned by
Gurvitch.
Now let us examine the third class of phenomena which Gurvitch regards
as law. Speaking of intuitive law, he asserts that "this kind of lawv . . .
drives towards the revision and reform of law." (p. 227). In this somewhat
contradictory statement, Gurvitch probably has in mind the influence of wide-
ly spread opinions as to desirable changes in law. To consider such opinions
as an inherent part of the law is confusing. It would be very difficult to
determine, in regard to such opinions, the social guarantee even in the mildest
form of disapproval. What actually exists in such cases is disagreement
among those who recognize divergent social ideals.
Opinions discussed by Gurvitch under the heading of intuitive law are
actually value judgments regarding the fact of the corporate acceptance in a
given society of certain standards of right (which by definition are value
judgments). Here is perhaps the greatest difference between Gurvitch',
doctrine and the commiunis opinio. He considers as belonging to law all value
judgments orientated towards law, prcivided they are "comnonly recognized"
by a social group. But the method of "acknowledging" such recognition is
left unspecified. All the difficulties involved in treating the nebulous con-
1. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941).
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cept of "public opinion" would have appeared if Gurvitch had attempted
to elaborate his theory.
Anyone is privileged to define law as he sees fit. But a revolutionary ter-
minology (such as the one Gurvitch has constructed) should be accepted
only if it provides a framework for the observation, classification, and under-
standing of phenomena more convenient than the one commonly used. This
reviewer believes that the definition here discussed (toes not meet these re-
quirements.
Let us proceed as follows. A well defined species of collective behavior
has been segregated as part of the general process of social differentiation.
This collective behavior in modern society is focused around the activity of
courts and analogous agencies and has created the profession of lawyers
(with further sub-differentiation) and the science of jurisprudence. Is not
this species important enough to be designated by a special term? And has
not the term "law" become the "symbol" of this class of socially significant
acts, a symbol which immediately evokes the corresponding "referent?" Is
it desirable to destroy a well-established symbol-referent structure by applying
the symbol to phenomena which are substantially different from those imme-
diately evoked by the symbol? Is it not preferable to look for another term
for the designation of that class of thought-objects which Gurvitch dis-
cusses under the heading of law? True it is, that in the preface to Gur-
vitch's book, Roscoe Pound explains, "clearly, sociologists do not mean by
law what the lawyer means." And Pound is quite right insofar as Gurvitch
and say Ehrlich, are concerned. But many sociological works (among them
Maclver's Society and the reviewer's Introduction to the Sociology of Law),
attempt to deal sociologically with that product of social differentiation which
comprises the work of judges, lawyers, and jurists.
Gurvitch's unfortunate expansion of the concept of law is conducive to
some shortcomings in his systematic treatment of the subject-matter of the
sociology of law. Thus, discrimination between reality judgments and nor-
mative judgments is lacking, despite the author's explicit recognition of the
perils of confusing these concepts. The ambiguity evidently results from the
introduction into the framework of laws of normative judgments about law
in force. The statement is made that the law of the unorganized nation
possesses jural primacy over that of the State or of the economic society.
This proposition probably means that unorganized social forces operating in
the population of a State decide what the competence of the State is to be;
whether it shall be a liberal, a totalitarian or some other kind of State, and
what is to be the relationship between the political and economic organization
of society. Now is this a reality judgment? Can it be asserted that it is al-
ways and everywhere valid-even in societies to which the term nation is
hardly applicable, despite a political organization in the form of the State,
such as that of th& Austrian monarchy in the 18th century? Or is this a
normative proposition expressing the desirability of a certain kind of regula-
tion? If the latter is true, the proposition is not sociological, since sociology,
discussing value judgments, does not formulate any. Its place would be




This lengthy criticism should not be considered as invalidating the initial
statements of this review. Gurvitch's work is outstanding, and a number of
his propositions after careful restatement may play a great part in the ad-
vancement of general sociology and the sociology of law. It is because this
work is so excellent that its basic concepts should be subjected tos careful
analysis.
N. S. TIMASHEFFf
DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Green Haywood Hackworth. Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1941. Two vols., vol. 1, pp. 803,
$1.75; vol. 2, pp. 829, $2.00.
FEw persons realize how great an influence on the development of inter-
national law and on the practice of Foreign Offices generally has been
exerted by the publication of John Bassett Moore's Digest of International
Law (8 v. 1906). Through that work the opinions of the United States
Government on questions of international law have spread far and wide, and
other governments have even been persuaded to alter their standing custom
by permitting a discreet publication of a small part of their archives in the
field of international law. Moore's Digest was much more than a revision
of Wharton's Digest (3 v. 1886-87). It was a complete rearrangement of
the diplomatic correspondence, instructions and dispatches of the United
States, of treaties and agreements, decisions of courts, opinions of the Atts-r-
ney-General, extracts from treatises and monographs, and a considerable
portion of the original learning of judge Moore himself which illuminated
every chapter of that indispensable work. It was not only a scientific achieve-
ment of the first magnitude-omitting reference here to the companion Digest
of International Arbitrations (6 v. 1896)-but enhanced the reputation and
influence of the United States, since Foreign Offices not only paid the closest
attention to the views expressed by American officials, but also, as I have had
occasion to learn, marvelled at the openhandedness of the United States in dis-
dosing its archives to public scrutiny in a form so easily accessible and so
cheap that every student and public official could have it at his side. When
judge Moore asked Secretary of State Sherman whether any part of the
archives were to be regarded as confidential and therefore not be published,
he was informed that everything in the Department was at his disposal for
publication. Those were the good old days.
Now, for the benefit of the profession and the public, comes a continuation
of Moore's work, fashioned by the hands of Mr. Hackworth and his assist-
ants in the Department of State. Only the first two volumes uf what is e,-
pected to be an eight volume work have thus far been published; and while
it is not likely that the Department is now as generous in disclusing all its
archives as it was in 1906, still we must be grateful for the supplemental
material offered for our inspection. Air. Hackworth states that the material
since 1906 is more voluminous than that accumulated up to that date, and
tAssistant Professor of Sociology, Fordliam University.
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probably space considerations alone dictated some selection. The classifica-
tions laid out by Mr. Moore are quite faithfully followed, as well as the
scholarly methods of full recitals of fact which Mr. Moore inaugurated.
Although the material was largely gathered and classified by devoted assist-
ants, Mr. Hackworth has personally supervised and revised all newly com-
posed material and assured himself that the extracts presented an intelligible
picture of the case, the respective contentions and the final result.
In subject-matter, the material in these first eight chapters covers inter-
national law in general, states and governments, recognition, acquisition of
territory and sovereignty, national jurisdiction and territorial limits, includ-
ing water domain and contiguous seas, the legal effects of national jurisdic-
tion,' exemptions from territorial jurisdiction, including asylum, and the
high seas and interoceanic canals.
Access to the material is aided by side-hearings, and each document carries
a reference to the original source. Extracts or digests from opinions of courts
occupy considerable space. The work includes reports of arbitral decisions
and extracts from the report of the United States Agent. Matter from the
Foreign Relations, already accessible, and extracts from treatises are not ex-
cessively reprinted. Perhaps more of the original views of authorities printed
in legal periodicals and not readily available might have been preferable to
extracts from well-known text-books. The summaries of long dispatches
and the new matter connecting quotations from original source material have
apparently been prepared with exceptional care and the treaty material seems
to have been well selected to convey an idea of modern practice. Considered
judgments on the merits of special chapters are difficult to express until
time affords a better opportunity actually to use the material in practice or
study; but from what has been examined it is evident that a serious effort
has been made to continue the scholarly, scientific standards set by Moore's
Digest. The work is a great credit to the learned editor, a man of excellent
judgment and balance and long experience in the Department of State, to
the assistant editors and to the United States.
EDWIN BORCIIARD t
ARGUMENT FROM ROMAN LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1200-1600. By
Myron Piper Gilmore. (Harvard Historical Monographs, XV) Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. 148. $2.00.
THERE is a growing realization among historians of political and legal
thought that the influence of Roman law in the Middle Ages and even in the
sixteenth century, the period of the rise of the national state and monarchic
centralization, was more that of constitutional limitations on the power of
tJustus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University.
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the prince than of justifications of royal absolutism. In this book, the specific
influence of Roman law on the theory of the distinction between the power
of the prince and the magistrates' right to office, between public power and
private property, is studied carefully and penetratingly by Dr. Gilmore. Ile
traces the history of the interpretations of mncrui inpcruin (as discussed
by Papinian and Ulpian) from about 1200 to 1600, showing how the Roman
law was adapted first to medieval feudal society and later to the national
state.
Among the glossators and post glossators the dominant interpretation, from
Azo to Bartolus, fitted meiruin inperhn into a society in which public
authority was shared, in hierarchic degree, by all magistrates from emperor
to the lowest officer having "ordinary jurisdiction". This impcrium was
chiefly jurisdiction, though Bartolus included the right to found law in the
higliest degree of merum inipcrium. This hierarchy of jurisdiction reflected
the fact that public power was not separated from private property; the
magistracy had some proprietary right to the powers.
In the sixteenth century French humanists were in conflict with the Bar-
tolists. They generally were opposed to the idea that magistrates had a
proprietary right in the mcrum inpcrhon. The magistrates exercised it,
while the right to it resided in the prince (Alciatus). The public power,
vested in the prince, was dissociated from private proprietary right; the
prince was absolute in the sphere of administration and limited in the sphere
of the private common law (as in medieval theory). But the prince's nwrtum
imperhm was that of high criminal jurisdiction rather than legislation, which,
however, was reserved to the prince as a faculty. Dumunlin exalted the
royal power still further, and emphasized the making of law; in theory,
the magistrates had no proprietary right in their offices.
Bodin denied that magistrates could share with the prince in the stummum
impcrium, which becomes sovereignty. But if Bodin substituted the concept
of sovereignty for that of supreme jurisdiction, and if Loyseau distinguished
public power from private property, this was not synonymous with a theory
of absolutism. For even if the king alone possessed the incrum ihpcrzum,
the French magistracy did have some sort of right in offices; and thus the
magistracy limited royal absolutism.
Thus does Gihnore show how the Roman law on this point, as on others,
was one of the forces that limited the power of the prince up to the end of
the sixteenth century. Dr. Gilmore would admit that this and other influences
of Roman law on political theory need further study in relation to the papal
plenitudo potestatis; to the Roman theory of consent in private law and its
limitation of the power of the prince; and to the Romano-medieval idea that
the prince, as highest judge, in effect "legislated" as judge by interpreting
as well as by founding the law. It is perhaps not wise to distinguish too
clearly between jurisdiction and administration, or between jurisdiction and
legislation in the fourteenth century monarchy (Bartolus is not an expert
on French kingship). Further, by his powers of dispensing and interpreting,
the prince (if not the Emperor) sometimes had more prerogative than the
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Bartolists would allow in their discussions of imperium alone. But for what
it is intended, this is a cautious, thoughtful and praiseworthy study.
GAINES PosT t
t"Associate Professor of History, University of Wisconsin.
Erratum: "The Regulation of Stock Exchange Members",
reviewed at page 884 of the March issue of the YALE LAw
JOURNAL, was published by the Columbia University Press
and not, as the review stated, by the New York University
Press.
